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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
vs. : 
LEE ALLEN AASE, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : Case No. 870276-CA 
Before Judges: Garff, 
: Billings and Greenwood. 
BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is confired upon this Court 
pursuant to Rule 35, Rules Of The Utah Court Of Appeals, 
effective April 10, 1987. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant-Appellant requests a Re-Hearing from a 
decision rendered on the 14th day of October, 1988, affirming a 
jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted criminal homicide, 
rendered on the 11th day of May, 1987, in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Rodney 0. Page presiding. Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice 
Of Appeal with the Utah Court Of Appeals on July 10, 1987. The 
Court rendered its decision with regards to the above-entitled 
matter on the 14th day of October, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF THB ISSUE 
1. The Court of Appeals made an erroneous determination 
as to the Defendant-Appellant's claim that he is entitled to a 
new trial because the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch, 
during its deliberations, without an officer sworn to keep them 
together as required by §77-17-11, Utah Code Annotated (1982). 
STATEMENT OF THB CASE 
Defendant, LEE ALLEN AASE, was charged with attempted 
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under §§76-5-203 
and 76-4-101, Utah Code Annotated (1978 and supp. 1987)(R.60-64). 
The Utah Court Of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an opinion 
rendered on the 14th day of October, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues raised by the Defendant-Appellant on the 
Petition For Re-Hearing generally do not require a resistation of 
facts beyond that contained in the Statement of Facts in his 
Appeal. However, Defendant-Appellant brings to the Court's 
attention that after the Defendant-Appellant had rested his case 
at trial, and after the parties had concluded their closing 
arguments, and after the bailiff had been sworn to take custody of 
the jury for its deliberations, and without knowledge of defense, 
the jury, during its deliberations, was permitted to recess for 
lunch prior to the rendering of its verdict. T.T. Vol. Ill, 
Page 78 and Pages 4 and 5 of the Addendum, Minute Entry of May 11, 
1988, and the Juror's Affidavit attached hereto. Further, the 
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Defendant did not discover the impropriety alleged herein until 
after he had been sentenced and his Notice Of Appeal filed with 
the Court. It was the Defendant-Appellant's understanding that 
jurisdiction had transfered to the Utah Court Of Appeals prior to 
his discovery of reversible error. Therefore, no objection 
could have been made to the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE AN ERRONEOUS DETERMINATION 
AS TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE JURY WAS PERMITTED TO ADJOURN FOR LUNCH, 
DURING ITS DELIBERATIONS, WITHOUT AN OFFICER SWORN TO KEEP THEM 
TOGETHER AS REQUIRED BY §77-17-11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1982). 
In affirming Defendant-Appellant's conviction, this 
Court held that the issue as to whether Aase is entitled to a new 
trial because the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch during 
its deliberations without an officer sworn to keep them together 
could not be raised for the first time on appeal because it was 
not raised before the trial Court. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 
799, 801 (Utah Court. App. 1987) has been cited as the 
controlling authority. Apparently in support of its decision not 
to consider the question arising from the alleged irregularity 
in the District Court proceedings, this Court incorrectly stated, 
at page 6 of the Opinion, that "the record on appeal contains no 
indication that the unescorted lunch occured". 
Clearly the principle that matters not raised in the 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may not be raised for the 
first time on appeal promotes the prompt and efficient 
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administration of justice. As the Court stated in Bundy v. 
Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), citing Simpson 
v
- General Motors, 24 Utah 2d, 301,303,470, P.2d 399, 401 (1970). 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose in the 
final settlement of controversies, requires that 
a party must present his entire case and his theory 
or theories of recovery to the trial Court; and 
having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion 
a merry-go-round litigation. 
See also James v. Preston, Supra @ P.50. 
This rule cannot, however, operate to effectively 
eliminate constitutional as well as statutary protections 
guaranteed to criminal defendants, especially where the Defendant 
harmed as a result of the violation has no notice of the 
violation and logically, therefore, has no opportunity to object. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "exceptional 
circumstances " may arise requiring a review of matters raised 
for the first time on Appeal. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 
254 (Utah 1983). Here, the exceptional circumstances are that 
neither Defendant nor his attorneys knew of the unescorted lunch 
until jurisdiction had been transfered to the Court of Appeals. 
If the Defendant and his attorneys had been appraised of the 
unescorted lunch, or even the possibility thereof, they would 
have made their objection clear to the trial judge. It should 
not be presumed that any attorney defending a prisoner charged 
with a felony crime would permit this type of irregularity 
without objection. 
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In State v. Morgan, 23 U. 214 (1900), James Morgan was 
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in July, 
1899. His conviction was affirmed on Appeal and remanded for an 
Order requiring execution of the death penalty. After the case 
had been remanded to District Court, a Motion was filed 
requesting a new trial on grounds that he had recently discovered 
that jurors had responded falsely to voir dire questions 
concerning any bias they may have had towards Morgan prior to his 
trial on the matter. The declarations of the jurors, as set out 
in Affidavits, were unknown to either the Defendant or his 
attorneys until July 26, 1900, 24 days after the District Court 
had entered a new Order to execute Morgan pursuant to the remand. 
The Motion was denied and this Appeal followed. 
In vacating the judgment and granting Morgan a new 
trial, the Court articulated several principles of law which are 
intregal parts of the foundation upon which our criminal justice 
system has been built and exists today. At the forefront is the 
principle that a "Defendant on trial for felony is entitled to 
all the protections which (a) statute intends to secure..." Id. 
@ P. 224. The proposition which necessarily goes hand in hand 
with that fundamental principle is that "The (Supreme) Court is 
constituted to enforce legal rights and redress legal wrongs, and 
whenever it is made to appear, as it is in this case, that a 
wrong has been perpetrated, it does not hesitate to exercise the 
power with which it has, unless to do so would do a greater 
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injury than to refuse to exercise it." Id. @ P. 231. 
In Morgan, the State had argued that a new trial could 
not be had because the rules did not provide grounds upon which 
to base the Motion and because the Motion had not been made 
timely. But the Court responded by pointing to §12, Article 1 of 
the Utah Constitution guaranteeing the right of an accused in a 
criminal case to have a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury 
and the right to Appeal in all cases. The Court pointed out that 
"when a wrong is the violation of constitutional rights the 
legislature has no power to prohibit or substantially impair 
(the) remedies." Id. @ P. 228. Justice Hart, writing for the 
majority, went on to point out that 
In the absence of any legislative remedy for such 
wrongs, the Courts will resort to the common law 
if it affords a remedy, and if it does not, then 
the Courts, by virtue of their inherent power, and 
their duty in criminal cases to guard the rights of 
the persons will, if possible, devise new remedies, 
as has been done from a very remote period of time, 
by equity Courts, to meet new conditions and supply 
remedies for wrongs, when none already existed... 
(For) a right of which the person can not avail 
himself is practically no right. (Bishop on Criminal 
Procedure, §§113, 115, 307). 
Id @ P. 228, 229. 
During the course of a criminal prosecution, the accused 
has an absolute right to an impartial jury. In conjunction 
therewith, he has a right, and the Court has a responsibility to 
ensure, that whenever there is communication with the jury during 
its deliberations, the accused will be present. For how can he 
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exercise any right if he is not permitted to participate in all 
proceedings which may well result in his loss of liberty or life. 
The Court's communication with the jury during its deliberations 
on May 11, 1987, were ex parte. Neither Defendant nor his 
attorneys were present. Moreover, the unescorted lunch was not 
discovered until long after judgment had been entered. This 
Court had a duty on Appeal to review the Bailiff's Affidavit and 
the record and to fashion a remedy for Appellant. Anything less 
deprives Appellant of his Constitutional right to Appeal. Please 
see attached, Addendum at P. 5, the Juror's Affidavit. 
There can be no rule depriving an accused of due process 
or equal protection of the law simply because a violation thereof 
goes undiscovered for a period of time subsequent to his trial on 
the matter. Indeed, §11, Article 1 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah specifically provides that "All Courts shall be 
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law..." To say that Appellant has no remedy for the violation of 
law requiring an officer to keep his jury together, safe and 
private during deliberations and guaranteeing an impartial jury 
is to say that he has no right to have these protections. This 
cannot be the result this Court intended. As Justice Greenwood 
stated in her opinion, at page 6, "if the jurors were, indeed, 
allowed to go to lunch at a public restaurant, unescorted by the 
bailiff, the statute was clearly violated." 
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The record does disclose that the jury was excused for 
lunch during its deliberations. Neither the Defendant-Appellant 
nor his trial attorneys were present when the trial judge called 
the jury into the courtroom during deliberation and excused them 
for lunch. The minute entry of May 11, 1987 states, under no 
uncertain terms, that the bailiff was sworn and the jury excused 
for deliberations at 11:50 a.m.. Sometime between 11:50 a.m. and 
3:35 p.m., when they returned to find the Defendant guilty, they 
were "returned to the courtroom and excused for lunch." Addendum 
@ Pages 4 and 5 (T.T. Vol. 3 @ Pg. 82). The bailiff did not go 
with them nor did he keep them private and together. Because the 
trial took place in a small community involving a high profile 
local crime, prejudice must to be presumed. 
This Court has refused to consider the Bailiff's 
Affidavit attached to Appellant's Reply Brief in a consideration 
of Appellant's arguments on Appeal even given the unusual manner 
with which the jury was handled during its deliberations. To 
hold that this Affidavit does not fit within a well-defined rule 
governing submission of jury affidavits on appeal misses the 
point. Appellant understands that juror Affidavits are generally 
inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict with two exceptions: 
"1) When the verdict was determined by chance or bribery, 
U.R.C.P. 59(a)(2); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 
1983); Peats v. Commercial Security, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 
1987); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304 (Utah App. 1987); or 
-8-
2) to establish "whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to hear upon any juror." 
Hillier, 740 P.2d @ 305; Utah R. Evid. 606(b). Pritcher v. 
Department of Employment Security, 80 Utah Adv. Rep 20, 23 
(1988). The Appellant, however, does not challenge the conduct 
of the jury, nor does Appellant question the process by which the 
jury reached its verdict. Appellant challenges the irregularity 
in the proceedings which deprived him of a safe and private jury. 
Appellant further challenges the Order of the trial Court 
permitting the jury to be excused for lunch, unescorted, as an 
abuse of discretion which prevented him from having a fair trial. 
Rule 59(a)(1), Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure. In this respect 
the underlying policy of preventing attempts to undermine the 
integrity of verdicts which limits the availability of Affidavits 
on Appeal does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this 
case. To hold otherwise would deny Appellant his right to Appeal 
the trial Court's Order permitting the jury an unescorted lunch 
in violation of Section 12, Article 1, Utah Constitution and 
§77-17-11, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Court has held strong fast to the proposition that 
the right to Appeal is a fundamental right. State v. Morgan, 
Supra. It would be unconsicionable, given the facts and 
circumstances of this case, for the Court to refuse to consider 
the unescorted lunch and all of its ramifications. Appellant 
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requests that this Court remand this case to the District Court 
for a new trial. 
DATED this *2 ?**" day of October, 1988. 
RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: David L. Wilkinson, Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah on this 
J?X day of October, 1988. 
.<->£ ,. /*£<-
RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
jriainun 
vs. 
LEE ALLEN AASE 
Defendant 
Date 
5514 
Case No. 
RODNEY S. PAGE, Judge 
Hal Rees, Reporter 
Leslie Snow, Clerk 
This is the time set for jury trial. The State is 
represented by William McGuire and J. Mark Andrus. The defendant 
is present and represented by Randine Salerno and Kevin Sullivan. 
A jury is impaneled. Those chosen to serve are as follows: 
Julie Nisbet 
Gary E. Hogge 
Michael J. Logan 
Dan R. Eastman 
Claudia J. Seifert 
Terri M. Brown 
Lynn K. Porter 
M. Jolene Potter 
Marjorie E. Newson 
The Information is read aloud by the Clerk. 
Preliminary instructions are given by the Court to the jury. 
Exclusionary Rule is invoked. Opening statements are given by 
counsel. 
Court is adjourned for lunch and is resumed in session. 
Counsel and Court are in chambers along with the defendant and 
Larry Lewis who is representing KSL TV. Court will allow still 
pictures in the courtroom on the condition that no pictures are 
taken of the jury or with any member of the jury in view. There 
will be one photographer allowed and he is to confine himself to 
FILVIHD 
WBDADOH, P e t ^ r X , . 
C^f t tQgvi11P , Utah » 
rsan 
Uu 
Bountiful, Utah 
-SWAPP, Holly 
- Bountifuli Utnh-
m> *r & 
POTTER, M. Jolene 
Bountiful, Utah 
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offered and received. 
Dan Jones is sworn and testifies* Exhibits K, RR, S, H, I 
J, 0, P, Q, R, SS, T are offered and received. 
William Holthaus is sworn and testifies. Exhibits E, U, V, 
X, TT, W, ZZ, BB, & CC are offered and received. 
Gary Briant is sworn and testifies. Exhibit FF is offered 
and received. 
David Kennepohl is recalled and testifies. Exhibit PP is 
offered and received. 
Reed Mecham is sworn and testifies. 
William Holthaus is recalled and testifies. 
Dick Martin is sworn and testifies. Court will adjourn for 
the evening. 
May 8, 1987 
Court is resumed in session. Parties and counsel are 
present, jury is present and accounted for. 
Dick Martin resumes the stand and is admonished that he is 
still under oath. Exhibits 1, JJ, KK, LL, MM, & NN are offered 
and received. 
Court meets in chambers with counsel and defendant. 
Testimony is proffered by the State regarding the testimony of 
Idaho police officers who stopped the defendant some time in 1985 
and found he was carrying a gun loaded with snakeshot and 
hollowpoint rounds. Court finds that because of the length of 
WHllADON, Tetcr T£„» 
C&itorvi 11 P , Utah ^  
.SSAPP-r-STtsan ' 
B«Hmiiu'jL.uii,--irE5h 
LU 
LL. 
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 
'9WAFP, Hol ly— 
- DQuni-ifuli Utnh-
m ** A 
POTTER, M. Jolene 
Bountiful, Utah 
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outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
Court is resumed in session. Michael Stewart is sworn and 
testifies. 
Raymond Cooper is sworn and testifies. Exhibit HH is 
offered and received. 
Steve Major is sworn and testifies. 
Court is adjourned for lunch and is resumed in session. 
Mitchell Brock is sworn and testifies. 
Danny Glover is sworn and testifies. 
LaVee DeGarlis is sworn and testifies. 
Craig Shaw is sworn and testifies. 
Larry Gaines is sworn and testifies. 
David Brazil is sowrn and testifies. 
Ina Ray Ance is sworn and testifies. Exhibits II, 00 & UU 
are offered and received. 
State rests. 
Court is in chambers. Defense moves for directive verdict. 
Court finds that the jury could believe all of the inferences and 
if they did, there is sufficient evidence to take the matter to 
the jury and the motion is denied. 
Sheila Rowland is sworn and testifies. 
Gloria Walters is sworn and testifies. 
Gary Jenkins is sworn and testifies. 
Court is adjourned for the evening. 
May 11, 1987 
This is the time set for continued trial. Counsel and 
defendant are present, the jury is present and accounted for. 
Bountiful, Utah 
•swArr, Holly -
Bountiful; Utah-
14% **~ & 
Cghtorvi U P , Utah
 > ^ 
u. 
EehLiuii'iy Lun; u r ah 
- 3 -fft 
Court gives jury mstrucrionb. ^uuaooo. ^ --- ^ 
arguments. Ms. Seifert is excused as alternate juror. 
Bailiff is sworn and jury is excused for deliberation at 
11:50 a.m. 
Jury is returned to the courtroom and is excused for lunch, 
They are present and accounted for an continue deliberation. 
Jury is returned at 3:35 p.m. and find the defendant guilty of 
Attempted Criminal Homicide. Defendant is referred to AP&P for 
pre-sentence investigation and sentence is set for June 9, 1987 
at 1:30 p.m. Jury is polled. Jury is excused and court is 
adjourned. 
r U i \ J - X J ^ f XJJf XIXA x \ « 
WftEADONi Te^or K.„ U J B o u n t i f u l , Utah 
LL. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
vs. : 
LEE ALLEN AASE, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : Case No. 870276-CA 
Before Judges: Garff, 
: Billings and Greenwood. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
COMES NOW, JULIE NISBET, of Bountiful, Utah, State of 
Utah, County of Davis, and after having been duly sworn, deposes 
and affirms under oath as follows: 
1. That I am JULIE NISBET and am your affiant herein. 
2. That I was called to jury duty and sat as a juror 
during the trial of Lee Allen Aase in May of 1987. I 
participated in deliberations with regards to the criminal 
charges that were filed against Mr. Aase. 
3. That on the 11th day of May, 1987, the last day of 
Mr. Aase's trial, and during the period of time that we were 
deliberating concerning evidence presented during Mr. Aase's 
trial, we were released by the Court to go to lunch. Myself, 
along with two or three other juror's, went across the street to 
a public restaurant and ate. We returned back to the courtroom 
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JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT 
State vs. Aase 
Case No. 870276-CA 
Page Two 
at approximately 1:30 p.m. as we had been instructed by the 
Court. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 1988. 
Jtfr IE NISflET, Ju L BE ror 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 26th day of 
October, 1988. 
NOTARY fiUBLIC 
RESIDING IN: Ogden, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 1-06-92 
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Rebuttal Argument on Question Presented: 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS RETAINED JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER PETITIONER ARCHER'S APPEAL WHERE ARCHER 
FILED HIS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, 
Clark's initial argument in his brief seems to confuse the issue currently 
pending before this Court. Clark argues that a lack of filing a writ of certiorari after 
the denial of the petition for interlocutory appeal, this Court now lacks jurisdiction to 
hear Archer's appeal on the case in its entirety. However, the Court specifically 
placed at issue only one question for this briefing: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction 
to consider Petitioner's appeal and that Petitioner had waived the 
opportunity to challenge the propriety of a rule 54(b) certification in 
connection with his appeal. 
Thus, Clark's argument fully misses the point. The question is whether the Court of 
Appeals retained jurisdiction due to the fact that Archer timely filed a notice of appeal 
after the trial court erroneously certified its judgment as "final". Archer argues that, 
due to the Court's decision in Cedar Surgery Center. L.L.C. v. Bonelli 2004 UT 58, 96 
P.3d 911 (Utah 2004), Archer preserved his appellate right by filing his petition for 
interlocutory appeal. As Archer properly filed his Notice of Appeal, the Court of 
Appeals maintained jurisdiction to hear this appeal in its entirety. 
The petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed under the restraints of 
both Utah R. App. P. 4 and 5. Clark argues that Archer missed the 20-day deadline 
1 
under Rule 5. However, as the Index to the Court Record indicates, the "Notice of 
Entry of Final Judgment on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action" was filed on March 
17, 2008. The Notice of Filing of Petition for Appeal was filed on April 7,2008. This 
is twenty-one days after the entry of the trial court's order. However, the twentieth 
day after entry was Sunday, March 16,2008. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 22, if the 
final day of a period of time to file a document is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, 
the period extends to the following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. 
Archer timely filed his notice of appeal under each of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The Court of Appeals' underlying denial of Archer's appeal is based on Lindsey 
v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co.. 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995). In its decision, the Court 
of Appeals erroneously determined claim that Defendant Archer had failed to file an 
appeal of the trial court's decision. The entirety of the case law surrounding the point 
of law relied upon in Lindsey also rests on the premise that the party seeking appeal at 
the end of the case had failed to file an appeal of the order within the time frame 
allowed by Rule at the issuance of the trial court's decision. In this case, however, 
Defendant Archer did file a timely appeal of the decision. According to this Court's 
ruling in Cedar Surgical Center LLC. Defendant Archer's Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal was sufficient to preserve Archer's appeal rights regardless of whether the 
54(b) certification was proper. 
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Further, as demonstrated in the opening brief, the time for appeal of an 
improper Rule 54(b) certification does not start until all issues have been resolved at 
the trial level In re Integra Realty Resources. Inc.. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Or. 2001); 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. 919 F.2d 1230,1237 (7th Or. 1990), modified on other 
grounds, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Or. 1992), reversed on other grounds, 113 S. Ct 2606 
(1993). Therefore, even where Archer did not file a petition for writ of certiorariwith 
regard to the Court of Appeals' denial of Archer's petition for Interlocutory Appeal, 
where the Rule 54(b) certification is improper, the time to file an appeal did not begin 
to run until all matters before the trial court were resolved. 
Accordingly, Defendant Archer's appeal of the district court's Rule 54(b) 
certification, was not untimely. 
II. ARCHER PRESERVED HIS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO DENY THE APPEAL ON 
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES. 
Clark argues that Archer failed to raise his argument under Cedar Surgery 
Center v. BoneliL until Archer's opening brief and therefore Archer has waived his 
ability to raise this argument. In fact, in Archer's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
Archer stated as follows: 
The Court of Appeals, in its February 20, 2009 dismissal of Defendant 
Archer's appeal, stated that Defendant Archer had failed to timely file an 
appeal from the trial court's erroneously certified order. In fact, on 
March 31, 2008, Defendant Archer did appeal the trial court's order. 
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Defendant Archer sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal on 
the matter. 
Archer did not cite to Cedar Surgery Center. LLC v. BonellL but the argument 
was presented. Further, this Court specifically directed the parties to address the issue 
regarding whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear Archer's appeal. Nothing in the two footnotes cited by Clark prohibits putting 
before this Court new case law to support an appellant's argument. The first case 
cited by Clark stated that because the party had not stated the issue in its petition for 
review. Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest. 2004 UT 
104 flO, 106 P.3d 700, 702 n.2 (Utah 2004). In the instant case, however, Archer did 
preserve the issue in his petition for certiorari. 
Clark then cites to Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 a l l (Utah 1996). In Trail Mountain, the Court took 
issue with an issue that was raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. 
Archer has not waited until this Reply Brief to raise this issue. Archer preserved the 
issue in the Petition for Certiorari and fleshed the issue out in his Opening Brief. 
Archer has not waived his right to now be heard by this Court on whether the 
interlocutory appeal constituted sufficient notice to preserve his appellate rights under 
the Bonelli case. 
Archer properly preserved this issue on appeal through his Docketing 
Statement and Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Further, the Court has specifically asked 
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the parties to address the issue with whether the Court of Appeals had erred in 
claiming that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This issue is fleshed out more 
specifically by Archer in his Opening Brief Archer has properly raised the argument 
on the issue currently before this Court. 
III. T H E TRIAL COURTS 54(to CERTIFICATION OF THE RULING 
ON THE SECOND AND N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION WAS 
IMPROPER AS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN AND 
T H E FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS BETWEEN THE SECOND AND 
N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION OVERLAPPED WITH THE 
REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Clark raises three points in his argument that the trial court properly decided 
and certified the second and ninth causes of action in Clark's amended complaint. 
Archer does not dispute the first issue raised by Clark, that the amended complaint 
involved both multiple claims and multiple parties. 
The second issued raised, however, does present a problem with Clark's 
argument. The trial court based its decision on Clark's claim that the warranty deed 
had not been legally "delivered" to Archer. Clark's citation to the tidal court's order, 
however, fails to mention that Clark failed to bring his action until after the statute of 
limitations had expired on his cause of action. The trial court was unable to reach the 
merits of Clark's claim for failure of delivery without resolving the fact that Clark's 
claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court stated 
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The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely and 
viable today as well. The timeliness of this cause of action was the issue 
addressed by the supplemental briefing of the parties as requested by the 
Court. The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely 
based on the content of Archer's Affidavit Originally, the Court was 
focused on the principle or doctrine of the discovery rule in relationship 
to the application of the statue of limitations to the second cause of 
action of the amended complaint. However, the Court need not rely 
upon or analyze the application of the discovery rule because of the 
content of Archer's Affidavit. 
R. 460. 
The trial court relied on an affidavit filed by Archer in the trial court after Clark 
had commenced the action as the reaffirmation of a debt that extended the statute of 
limitations under Utah Code Annotated §78B-2-113(l)(b). What the trial court failed 
to consider is that the terms of U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)1 only apply where the 
affirmation of an outstanding debt comes within the timeframe for bringing an action 
on that outstanding debt. State Bank v. Troy Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah 
App. 1995). In this case, where the affidavit came after the statute of limitations had 
run on the underlying cause of action, Archer's affidavit could not be used to act as a 
reaffirmation of any debt. Troy Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d at 1276. Therefore, regardless 
of whether delivery of the deed was effective, the entire matter was improperly before 
the trial court as the statute of limitations had expired. 
1
 U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)states in relevant part: Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay 
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of limitations from the date: 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the debtor, 
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Clark's final point, that the trial court's ruling met the requirement of "finality" 
necessary to allow the court to certify the issue for appeal under Rule 54(b), fails to 
counter the arguments raised by Archer in his Opening Brief. Specifically, Archer 
points to the argument and citations presented to the Court on pages 1 2 - 1 7 . In that 
discussion, Archer demonstrates that the trial court's certification was improper. The 
factual issues the trial court attempted to resolve in its ruling overlapped with the 
factual issues of the remaining causes of action. 
As demonstrated in Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R.. 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997), 
Clark's second cause of action contained factual overlap with the remaining causes of 
action. A successful appeal by Archer on this one cause of action will allow Clark to 
return to the trial court in an attempt to regain possession of the land through another 
cause of action raised in his amended complaint. The appeal of the trial court's Rule 
54(b) certified cause of action would, therefore result in a piecemeal appeal. This is 
precisely what this Court has sought to avoid throughout the cases that have been 
brought under a Rule 54(b) certification. Id. at 597. Accordingly, Clark's argument 
on finality fails to meet the three-prong test for certification to be proper under Rule 
54(b). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, along with the reasons stated in his Opening 
Brief, Archer respectfully requests that this Court determine that the Court of Appeals 
did have jurisdiction to hear Archer's appeal on the issues raised at the trial court. 
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Respectfully submitted this 15* day of January 2009 
B. Ray Zoll, 
icah Bruner, 
Counsel for Appellant/Defendant Archer 
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